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Compensation, status, and press coverage of managers in the U.S. follow a highly skewed distribution:
a small number of 'superstars' enjoy the bulk of the rewards. We evaluate the impact of CEOs achieving
superstar status on the performance of their firms, using prestigious business awards to measure shocks
to CEO status. We find that award-winning CEOs subsequently underperform, both relative to their
prior performance and relative to a matched sample of non-winning CEOs. At the same time, they
extract more compensation following the award, both in absolute amounts and relative to other top
executives in their firms. They also spend more time on public and private activities outside their companies,
such as assuming board seats or writing books. The incidence of earnings management increases after
winning awards. The effects are strongest in firms with weak governance, even though the frequency
of obtaining superstar status is independent of corporate governance. Our results suggest that the ex-post
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A superstar system, as deﬁned by Rosen (1981), is characterized by a highly skewed distrib-
ution of income, market share, and public attention. Over the last two decades, the market
for top U.S. corporate executives has evolved to closely ﬁt this description. Prominent chief
executive oﬃcers (CEOs) in the U.S. have enjoyed a surge in income and income shares (Mur-
phy, 1999; Saez, 2006). They have also attracted increased public attention. Media sources
like Business Week dedicate several issues per year to various CEO awards, and publications
like Forbes, Fortune, and Time have initiated their own lists. CEOs have become the faces
of their corporations, starring in ad campaigns, courting regular media coverage, and making
cameo appearances on prime time television shows (e.g., Bill Gates in Frasier and Lee Iacocca
in Miami Vice).
Evaluated from an ex-ante perspective, a superstar system may induce a higher surplus than
a less skewed distribution of rewards. Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that tournaments that
reward workers based on their ordinal rank can provide optimal incentives. Moreover, the
tournament system and skewed distribution of rewards may attract the best talent. However,
whether the large compensation of top-level executives reﬂects optimal incentive design in the
interest of shareholders or rent extraction by entrenched CEOs remains the subject of debate
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuck and Fried, 2003; Gabaix and Landier, 2008).
The “tournament” for CEO status and public attention is not designed by shareholders as
an incentive device, but is instead largely conducted by the media. As a result, the value
consequences of superstar status are unclear. A media-designed tournament is unlikely to
account for winners’ changing behavior ex-post, once the incentives provided by competition
for superstar status disappear. While the increased media exposure may boost proﬁtability,
it could also shift power towards the CEO and induce perquisite consumption in the spirit of
Jensen and Meckling (1976).
In this paper, we analyze the ex-post value consequences of the managerial superstar system.
We exploit shifts in CEO status due to CEO awards conferred by major national media or-
ganizations. We link award-induced changes in status to corporate performance and CEO
decision-making, using matched non-winning CEOs as a benchmark. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with
award-winning CEOs subsequently underperform, both in terms of stock and operating perfor-
1mance. At the same time, CEO compensation increases, CEOs spend more time on activities
outside the company like writing books and sitting on outside boards, and they are more
likely to engage in earnings management. The ex-post eﬀects are strongest in ﬁrms with poor
corporate governance, but governance does not aﬀect the ex-ante likelihood of attaining su-
perstar status. Our ﬁndings suggest that the superstar system has negative ex-post value
consequences for shareholders. While the net eﬀect of the superstar system, after accounting
for ex-ante incentives, is hard to assess, the prevalence of ex-post value destruction in ﬁrms
with poor corporate governance suggests that it is optimal to increase monitoring after CEOs
win awards.
The belief that prominent achievers subsequently underperform is widely-held in many diﬀerent
contexts. In sports, the “Sports Illustrated Jinx” is believed to aﬀect athletes who appear on
the cover of Sports Illustrated. In the entertainment industry, the term “Sophomore Jinx” refers
to successful new performers who do not live up to the quality of their debuts. In academia,
Paul Samuelson describes (the vulgar view of) “Nobel Prize Disease” as winners withering away
“into vainglorious sterility” and “preaching to the world on ethics and futurology, politics and
philosophy.”1 And in business, the media has coined the term “CEO Disease” to refer to
the tendency of CEOs to underperform after achieving the top position in their organizations
(Byrne, Symonds, and Siler 1991). In all of these cases, however, the popular belief in the curse
of celebrity could represent a failure to distinguish between a real decline in performance and
mean reversion. Individuals who achieve outstanding success likely had extreme positive draws
from the process generating their output. Their next draws are unlikely to meet or exceed prior
realizations, causing their individual average performance to revert to the population mean. A
second concern in evaluating the performance of winners is that they are unobservably diﬀerent
from the losers, making a direct comparison problematic.
We use several empirical methods to address both issues and to identify a credible counter-
factual for the winning CEOs. As our main identiﬁcation strategy, we construct a nearest-
neighbor matching estimator, both with and without bias adjustment, following Abadie and
Imbens (2007). We estimate a logit regression to identify observable ﬁrm and CEO character-
istics that predict CEO awards. We then match each award winner to the non-winning CEO
1Samuelson, “Is There Life After Nobel Coronation?”,
http://nobelprize.org/economics/articles/samuelson/index.html.
2who, at the time of the award, had the closest predicted probability of winning, or “propensity
score” (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). CEO awards are a natural application for matching
since the awards are given by corporate outsiders who, like the econometrician, have to rely on
publicly available information to assess CEO quality. Though we do not observe the criteria
that judges use to select award winners, nor the set of runners-up for the award, the matching
procedure “reconstructs” this information using observable characteristics. A concern, how-
ever, is that remaining heterogeneity across winners and their matches, which is not correlated
with the observable ﬁrm and CEO characteristics on which we match, biases our estimation.
To minimize this concern, we verify that award winners and the matched control sample are
indistinguishable along most observable dimensions, including ﬁrm and CEO characteristics
not explicitly included in the match procedure.
Using the matched sample as a benchmark, we study the impact of CEO awards on ﬁrm out-
comes. We ﬁnd that award-winning CEOs underperform over the three years following the
award, both relative to expectations and to the matched sample of predicted winners. The
results are similar when we compute abnormal performance using market-model event returns
or the alpha from a four-factor return model in which the zero-investment portfolio is long in
award winners and short in predicted winners: relative underperformance is between 15 and
26%. Operating performance, measured as return on assets, follows a similar pattern. Despite
the decline in performance, the compensation of award-winning CEOs increases signiﬁcantly
over the three years following the award, an increase not shared either by predicted winners or
by the next-highest paid executives in their ﬁrms. The increase comes in the form of equity-
based compensation, but not in cash. One interpretation is that ﬁrms boost performance-based
compensation to oﬀset heightened agency problems after CEOs become superstars. An alterna-
tive interpretation is rent extraction by powerful CEOs (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Consistent
with the latter interpretation, the concurrent increases in compensation and decreases in per-
formance only arise in ﬁrms with poor corporate governance (or entrenched management), as
measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index.
We perform a variety of robustness checks on the matching procedure. We verify that the
results do not depend on using a single match for each award winner, but are similar using
the two, three, or four nearest neighbors as predicted winners. We also match directly on ﬁrm
and CEO characteristics, rather than using the propensity score. We use the bias adjustment
3procedure of Abadie and Imbens (2007) to ensure that the (few) diﬀerences in characteristics
that persist in the propensity-score framework do not drive our results.2 We also verify our
estimates of the treatment eﬀect using two methodologies which do not require a nearest-
neighbor match: propensity score weighting (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 1996; Hirano,
Imbens, and Ridder, 2003) and control functions (Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004).
Next, we explore one channel through which changes in the behavior of CEOs who become
superstars may aﬀect ﬁrm outcomes: increased involvement in activities outside CEOs’ core
responsibilities, such as writing books or joining outside boards. Since such activities occur at
lower frequency than compensation choices or stock price changes and at diﬀerent times (rela-
tive to the award) for each individual, we cannot apply our matched “event-study” framework.
Instead, we measure the cumulative eﬀect of CEO awards on these distractions, exploiting
variation in the number of awards across CEOs and over time. We ﬁnd that the frequency
with which CEOs write books increases in the number of prior awards. CEOs also increase
their membership on external boards as they win awards. Further, award-winning CEOs have
signiﬁcantly lower golf handicaps than non-winners, consistent with more time spent on leisure
activities. As with performance and compensation, we ﬁnd that these activities are more
common in ﬁrms with poor corporate governance.
Finally, we show that, subsequent to winning an award, CEOs are more likely to engage in
earnings management. Following DeGeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999), we analyze two
measures of active earnings management: exactly meeting analyst earnings forecasts and left-
skewness of the earnings-surprise distribution. We ﬁnd that both phenomena increase after
CEOs win awards and are more common among award-winning CEOs than among CEOs
who do not win awards. As with distracting activities, the increase in earnings management
occurs mainly in ﬁrms with weak corporate governance. Moreover, award-winning CEOs are
signiﬁcantly more likely to report negative earnings once ﬁve years have passed from their last
award than other CEOs. One interpretation is that CEOs artiﬁcially inﬂate earnings numbers
to maintain expected “superstar performance” for as long as possible.
Our results suggest a mechanism by which superstar status diminishes performance: CEOs
2Consistent with Abadie and Imbens (2007), we ﬁnd that the bias adjustment has little impact on our
estimate of the treatment eﬀect when we match on propensity scores, but matters when we match on covariates.
4increase both rent extraction and the consumption of perks. However, our analysis does not
identify all channels through which powerful CEOs aﬀect shareholder value and does not mea-
sure potentially positive ex-ante eﬀects created by the tournament for status. We also do
not distinguish supply from demand: Award-winners may increase perk consumption because
their preferences change toward living the “jet set life” and away from maximizing shareholder
value (increased demand). Or, managers may have always had a preference for the trappings
of celebrity and awards make such perks more available (increased supply). In either case,
our results show that the media plays a causal role in fostering a celebrity culture and enables
the observed changes in behavior, with potentially value-destroying consequences for share-
holders. Moreover, the eﬀects appear to be avoidable in well-governed ﬁrms, underscoring the
importance of strong shareholder protection.
Our results contribute to the literature analyzing the eﬀect of managerial power on corporate
outcomes. Prior literature measures CEO power using founder status or the accumulation of
titles within the organization. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) ﬁnd that founder CEOs or
“BOSSes”, in the sense of title accumulation, are rarely removed internally by the board of
directors, but are disproportionately the targets of hostile takeovers. Consistent with BOSSes
being more powerful (and entrenched),A d a m s ,A l m e i d a ,a n dF e r r e i r a( 2 0 0 5 )ﬁnd that their
performance is more variable than that of other CEOs. Our paper goes beyond these prior
studies by identifying clear shifts in CEO status (prominent media awards) and linking them
to CEO decision-making and performance, allowing us to rule out alternative ﬁrm-level expla-
nations. Our results also imply that explicit incentives and governance mechanisms become
more important as the CEO’s status increases: strong shareholder rights limit the ability of
powerful CEOs to take value-destroying actions. Our paper also relates to the broader litera-
ture asking whether managers matter for corporate outcomes. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and
Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2006) use ﬁxed-eﬀects analyses and unexpected
successions to identify time-invariant managerial eﬀects on corporate decisions. Our analysis
diﬀers by focusing on a speciﬁc, time-varying channel through which CEOs aﬀect performance:
CEO status.
Our results also relate to the recent literature analyzing the value consequences of CEO perks.
Yermack (2006) ﬁnds that ﬁrms which provide the CEO access to a corporate jet signiﬁcantly
5underperform. Similarly, Liu and Yermack (2007) ﬁnd that company performance deteriorates
when the CEO acquires a large mansion, particularly if he liquidates company shares or options
to ﬁnance the transaction. Rajan and Wulf (2006), on the other hand, argue that perks may
create value in organizations, in part because they are an observable signal of power and status
within the organization.
Finally, we contribute to recent research on the role of the media in ﬁnancial markets. Reuter
and Zitzewitz (2006) show that the ﬁnancial media responds to past advertising by mutual
funds in their publications when making buy and sell recommendations. In the context of
corporate governance, Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales (forthcoming) argue that the media
enhances value by pressuring managers to reverse value-destroying policies. Our paper shows
that media coverage may also have a dark side for shareholders. By increasing CEO status,
the media enables CEOs to take actions which destroy value.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the diﬀerent
data sets. In Section 3, we assess the stock and operating performance of award winners and
measure changes in CEO compensation. In Section 4, we measure CEO distractions, focusing
on writing books and sitting on outside board seats. In Section 5, we ask whether winners
increase earnings management. Section 6 concludes.
2D a t a
The core of our data is a hand-collected list of the winners of CEO awards between 1975
and 2002. A variety of publications and organizations conferred awards on CEOs during
our sample period: Business Week, Financial World, Chief Executive, Forbes, Industry Week,
Morningstar.com, Time, Time/CNN, Electronic Business Magazine, and Ernst & Young. The
key criterion for inclusion in the sample is that the award is national, so that (1) any CEO
can potentially win it and (2) it is prominent enough to plausibly aﬀect CEO status. Figure
1 presents a histogram of the CEO awards by sample year. The two predominant sources are
Business Week and Financial World. The key features of each of the awards are as follows:
Business Week (circulation: 970,000). The editorial staﬀ chooses two types of annual award
6winners: Best Manager and Best Entrepreneur. The awards have been given since 1988. The
total number of Best Managers during our sample period is 230. Between 1992 and 1995,
there were roughly 15 winners per year, and since 1996 there have been 25 per year. The total
number of Best Entrepreneurs during our sample period is 58. The latter award was given less
consistently, with no winners in 1992 or 2000 and variable quantities, ranging from 3 to 10, in
the remaining years.
Financial World (circulation: 430,000). Financial World published an annual “CEOs of the
Year” list, chosen by the editorial staﬀ, for more than 20 years until 1997, when the magazine
ceased publication. The CEOs of the Year were classiﬁed into “Gold” (1 winner), “Silver”
(about 10 winners per year until 1994, 1 award per industry per year in 1995 and 1996, and 5
winners in 1997), “Bronze” (1 winner per industry), and “Certiﬁcates of Distinction” (2 winners
per industry.) There were always roughly 60 industries, though the classiﬁcations varied some
from year-to-year. Since we are interested in “superstars,” and there are a relatively large
number of Bronze and Certiﬁcate of Distinction recipients, we restrict our analysis to the Gold
and Silver winners. We check the robustness of our results to excluding the two anomalous
years 1995 and 1996, in which the number of silver awards was unusually large.
Chief Executive (circulation: 42,000). Chief Executive has chosen a CEO of the Year each year
since 1987. The magazine’s intended audience is CEOs and the award is chosen by a panel of
CEOs.
Forbes (circulation 910,000). Forbes began publishing a list of “Best Performing CEOs,”
selected by the editorial staﬀ, in 2001. There were 5 winners in 2001 and 10 winners in 2002.
Industry Week (circulation: 250,000). The Industry Week awards are based on a CEO survey.
In 1986 and 1987, winners were chosen in each of 4 categories: “Consumer Goods Companies”
(2 per year), “Finance and Other Companies” (3 in 1986; 2 in 1987), “High-Tech Companies”
(3 in 1986; 4 in 1987) and “Heavy Industry Companies” (4 per year). In 1989 and 1991, the
awards had only two categories: “Industrial Sector” (6 per year) and “Services Sector” (6 per
year). Starting in 1993, the magazine stopped dividing the winners into categories. There were
three winners in 1994, ﬁve in 1995, and a single CEO of the Year otherwise.
Morningstar.com. Morningstar.com began naming a CEO of the year, chosen by the editorial
7staﬀ, in 1999. There were two winners in 1999 and 2001 and a single winner each year otherwise.
Time (circulation: 4,000,000). Time magazine has named a “Person of the Year” for more
than 50 years. The winners are chosen by the editorial staﬀ and three times since 1975 (in
1991, 1997, and 1999) the honor has gone to a CEO.
Time/CNN. In 2001, Time together with CNN compiled a list of the 25 Most Inﬂuential Global
Executives.
Electronic Business Magazine (circulation: 65,000). Electronic Business Magazine has named
a CEO of the Year, chosen by the editorial staﬀ, each year since 1997.
Ernst & Young. Ernst & Young has awarded an “Entrepreneur of the Year” each year since
1989. The winners are chosen by a panel of independent judges. Three times there have been
multiple winners in a year: 1990 (2), 1994 (3), and 1997 (2).
We match the CEO award data with additional data on CEO characteristics, ﬁrm character-
istics and performance. We obtain CEO data from the Compustat Execucomp database. This
data set covers the CEOs and the four other highest-paid executives of S&P 500, S&P Mid-
Cap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600 ﬁrms since 1992 and contains information on demographics
and compensation. We use the tdc1 measure of total executive compensation, which includes
salary, bonus, other annual compensation (e.g., perquisites and other personal beneﬁts), re-
stricted stock grants, LTIP payouts, the Black-Scholes value of new option grants, and all other
total compensation (e.g. severance pay, debt forgiveness, etc.). Cash compensation (tcc) is
salary plus bonus. We also calculate the ratio of CEO total compensation to total compensa-
tion of the next highest paid executive in the ﬁrm and the ratio of CEO cash compensation
to cash compensation of the next highest paid executive. Using Execucomp data restricts our
analysis to CEOs in the Execucomp universe. Thus, we do not use awards prior to 1992 for
much of our analysis. The pre-1992 awards data is important in Section 4 in which we measure
the cumulative eﬀect of prior awards and can avoid censoring the CEOs’ history of past awards.
To measure company characteristics and performance, we merge in data from CRSP and
Compustat. We measure return on assets (ROA) as income before extraordinary items (item
18) plus interest expense (item 15), scaled by assets (item 6). Market capitalization is the stock
price multiplied by common shares outstanding. The book-to-market ratio is book equity over
8market equity, where book equity is stockholders’ equity (item 216) (if available, else book
value of common equity (item 60) + par value of preferred stock (item 130) or assets (item 6)
- total liabilities (item 181) [in that order]) plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment
tax credit (item 35), if available, minus the book value of preferred stock (redemption (item
56), liquidation (item 10), or par value (item 130) [in that order] depending on availability).
We also merge in the Fama-French return factors. The Fama-French SMB and HML factors
are constructed using the six Fama-French value-weighted portfolios formed on size and book-
to-market. SMB (Small Minus Big) is the average return on the three small portfolios minus
the average return on the three big portfolios. HML (High Minus Low) is the average return
on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the two growth portfolios. Rm-Rf, the
excess return on the market, is the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ
stocks (from CRSP) minus the one-month Treasury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates). UMD
(Up Minus Down) is constructed using the six Fama-French value-weighted portfolios formed
on size and 2-12 month prior returns. UMD is the average return on the two high prior return
portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios.
We hand-collect data on books, outside board seats, and golf handicaps to measure CEOs’
propensity to undertake external activities. We obtain data on books authored by sample CEOs
from Barnes and Noble.com. Our search uses the CEO’s name in the author ﬁeld under the
following categories of publications: Management & Leadership, Business Biography, General
& Miscellaneous, Careers & Employment, Business History, Economics, Women in Business,
International Business, Professional & Corporate Finance, and Human Resources. We collect
information on board seats from the SEC Edgar Database. The data on CEOs’ golf handicaps
covers CEOs in Fortune 1000 companies and comes from rankings published in Golf Digest.
Finally, we match quarterly earnings announcement data with our awards data set. The data
is derived from I/B/E/S and media sources and described in detail in DellaVigna and Pollet
(2004). We measure the consensus quarterly analyst forecast using the median forecast among
all analysts who make a forecast in the 30 calendar days prior to the earnings announcement.
Table 1 provides selected summary statistics of the data, split into CEO award winners and
other sample CEOs. We discuss the sample characteristics and the diﬀerences across the sub-
samples in Section 3.1.
93 Performance and Extractions
Major CEO awards enhance CEOs’ status and power within the ﬁrm. In this section, we assess
the value consequences of increased status, linking awards to changes in market valuation,
operating performance, and executive compensation. We also test whether the eﬀects vary
depending on the quality of the ﬁrms’ corporate governance.
3.1 Empirical Speciﬁcation
In the ideal empirical experiment, we would compare the performance of an award winner’s ﬁrm
to the same ﬁrm’s performance had the CEO not won the award. Since the counterfactual is not
observed, we must ﬁnd an empirical proxy for the hypothetical performance without the status
increase. A natural starting point is to compare average ex-post performance of award winners
to the average among all non-winning CEOs. This approach would provide a valid estimate of
the treatment eﬀect of the treated if assignment to the treatment group were random. However,
this assumption does not hold in our data. In Table 1, we test diﬀerences in ﬁrm characteristics
across the treatment group (CEO award winners) and the set of all non-winning CEOs. We
ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences along almost all dimensions. Notably, ﬁrm size, past
performance (measured by book-to-market ratios, returns over months 2-3, 4-6, 7-12, and 13-36
prior to the award month, and ROA), CEO tenure, and CEO compensation (both cash and
total) are signiﬁcantly higher among award winners (at the 1% level). Economically, these
diﬀerences reﬂect the endogeneity of CEO awards. They are chosen based, at least partly, on
past performance. Thus, using the full set of non-winning CEOs as our control sample, we
would mix real performance eﬀects resulting from the treatment with predictable performance
based on selection to the treatment group. In this case, the main concern is mean reversion:
CEOs who have experienced earnings from the upper tail of the distribution tend to experience
lower subsequent earnings.
We take several steps to isolate the real eﬀects of CEO status on corporate outcomes from
selection eﬀects. Our main strategy is to construct a nearest-neighbor matching estimator,
following the approach of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Abadie and Imbens (2007).3 While
3See Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens (2001) on the implementation of this estimator.
10we do not observe the criteria used to select award winners or the set of runners-up for the
award,4 the matching procedure reconstructs this information using observable characteristics.
One limitation is that we do not know the exact information set used to choose the winners.
Heterogeneity across winners and their matches could bias our estimation if it is uncorrelated
with the observable ﬁrm and CEO characteristics on which we match. To minimize this
concern, we test for diﬀerences between award winners and the matched control sample along
many observable dimensions, including ﬁrm and CEO characteristics not included in the match
variables (Table 1; described below).
We construct the control sample in two steps. First, we run a logit regression to predict CEO
awards based on ﬁrm and CEO characteristics. The sample consists of each month in which one
of our sample awards was granted (e.g., January of each year for the Business Week awards).
Months in which no awards are granted are not included in the logit regression. For all ﬁrms
in our sample, we set the binary dependent variable to 1 if the ﬁrm’s CEO won the award
granted in that month. We then regress this award indicator on controls for ﬁrm and CEO
characteristics. Given the diﬀerences in Table 1, we include ﬁrm size (the natural logarithm of
market capitalization at the beginning of the month before the award), book-to-market at the
end of the last ﬁscal year which ended at least 6 months prior to the award month, and returns
for months two to three, four to six, seven to 12, and 13 to 36 before the award month.5 We
also include dummies for years, award types, and the 48 Fama and French industries6.T h e
award-type dummies control for variation in the number of winners across awards, which shifts
the baseline probability of winning. For example, each Business Week award month (January
of every sample year) receives a 1 for the Business Week dummy, while all other award months
receive a 0. Finally, we include controls for CEO age, tenure and gender.
Table 2 presents the results of this logit regression. The coeﬃcient estimates are shown as odds
ratios. Overall, they conﬁrm the patterns from Table 1. As expected, CEOs of larger ﬁrms
4For Financial World Gold and Silver Awards, the Bronze Awards could serve as a control sample of runners-
up. However, since the magazine ceased publication in 1997, an analysis restricted to Financial World awards
would introduce concerns about the representativeness of the results and eliminate half of the sample years.
5These regressors are standard in cross-sectional return regressions and have been used, for example, by
Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).
6See Ken French’s website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html)
for deﬁnitions.
11with lower book-to-market ratios and higher past returns are signiﬁcantly more likely to win
awards. Several CEO characteristics also have signiﬁcant predictive power, even controlling for
ﬁrm and industry characteristics: CEOs with more experience are more likely to win awards.
Women and younger CEOs are also more likely to win awards, though the results are less
robust. The eﬀect of gender, though signiﬁcant at the 5% level, is identiﬁed using only four
female award-winners.
Next, we use the predicted values from the logit regression (propensity scores) to construct a
nearest-neighbor matched sample for the award winners. In each award month, we choose, with
replacement, the non-winning CEOs with propensity scores closest to those of each actual award
winner. We refer to this sample as “Predicted Winners.” We use the propensity score as the
match variable to reduce the dimensionality of the matching problem. The natural alternative
would be to match by simultaneously minimizing the distance across all characteristics included
in the ﬁrst stage (according to some priority rule). We ﬁnd that the propensity-score approach
r e s u l t si nam a t c hs a m p l ew i t hf e w e rs i g n i ﬁcant characteristic-by-characteristic diﬀerences to
the treatment sample. Thus, we report the results from this approach. We also use the
procedure of Abadie and Imbens (2007) to correct for remaining bias due to (ex ante) diﬀerences
between the treatment and control samples.7 We correct for diﬀerences in the propensity
scores of winners and Predicted Winners. This correction ensures, for example, that an outlier
winner with a propensity score too high to closely match does not drive our results. The
bias adjustment has a negligible impact on the estimates. As a robustness check, designed to
address concerns about any remaining diﬀerences in characteristics after the propensity score
match, we also rematch on the characteristics directly and adjust for bias due to diﬀerences in
each characteristic between treated observations and their matches.
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the Predicted Winners, side-by-side with the
summary statistics for the actual winners and the full sample of non-winners. For each variable,
it also provides p-values for a test of the hypothesis that the diﬀerence between award winners
and non-winners is zero (second-to-last column) and that the diﬀerence between award winners
and Predicted Winners is zero (last column). Among the variables included in the ﬁrst-stage
7The procedure estimates an auxiliary OLS regression of the eﬀect of the match variable(s) on the outcome
variable (in the control sample) and uses the estimates to adjust for diﬀerences in the match variable(s) between
the treatment and control samples.
12estimation, seven are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between award winners and non-winners at the 1%
level, but none are between winners and Predicted Winners. Only returns from months 13 to
36 prior to the award are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across winners and Predicted Winners at the
5% level, and CEO tenure at the 10% level. In both cases, the medians are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent, suggesting that a small number of outliers drive the diﬀerences in means.
We perform several additional tests to further check the quality of the match. First, we test for
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the pairwise interactions of the match variables across the winners and
Predicted Winners samples. If these interactions are important determinants of performance
or compensation, then matching on levels without also matching the interactions could bias
our results. Of the 36 pairwise interactions, only ﬁve are statistically signiﬁcant (none at
the 1% level), and all ﬁve involve either returns from months 13 to 36 prior to the award or
CEO tenure.8 Hence, the signiﬁcant level eﬀects likely drive the signiﬁcant interaction eﬀects.
Second, we perform out-of-sample tests for signiﬁcant diﬀerences in variables not included in
the ﬁrst stage estimation. Among 15 such variables, reported in Table 1, none are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent across the winners and Predicted Winners samples, while 11 are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
at the 10% level between winners and all non-winner CEOs (9 at the 1% level). For example,
net operating assets (or “balance sheet bloat”), which is used by Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and
Zhang (2004) to proxy for earnings management, is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between winners
and Predicted Winners in the month prior to the award, but is signiﬁcantly lower among
winners than among all non-winners. These results corroborate the choice of match variables
and conﬁrm that the match procedure selects CEOs and ﬁrms that are similar to the treatment
sample. We also conﬁrm that our ﬁndings are robust to larger numbers of matches (two, three,
or four nearest neighbors; untabulated).9 Finally, we supplement the propensity score with
additional controls when operating performance or compensation, rather than stock returns,
are the dependent variable. Our match variables contain standard predictors of stock returns,
including lagged performance. Though the match appears to correct for diﬀerences between
treated and control observations along most dimensions, we include lags of dependent variables
8The signiﬁcant interactions are size * returns from month 13 to 36 (p = 0.056), book-to-market * returns
from month 13 to 36 (p = 0.071), returns from month 4 to 6 * tenure (p = 0.029), returns from month 13 to 36
* age (p = 0.033), and returns from month 13 to 36 * tenure (p = 0.026).
9As we increase the number of matches, the diﬀerences in match variables between the treated and matched
observations increase, making the bias adjustment procedure more important. The single match case makes the
side-by-side comparisons of the treated and control samples, without bias adjustment, easier to interpret.
13other than returns to control for any residual ex ante diﬀerences.
As a ﬁnal robustness check, we estimate the average treatment eﬀect using two alternate
methodologies which do not rely on nearest-neighbor matching. First, we use the propensity
score weighting estimator developed by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996). We use the ﬁrst-
stage propensity scores as weights (rather than as a matching variable) in a regression of the
outcome variable on the treatment indicator. The resulting weighted least-squares regression
gives more weight to non-treated observations with larger estimated probabilities of receiving
treatment.10 Second, following Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004), we run a full sample
OLS regression of the outcome variable on the treatment indicator, using control functions to
correct for diﬀerential probabilities of treatment across observations. As control functions, we
include ﬁrst-, second-, and third-order polynomials in the propensity score, estimated, again,
as above. Both alternative methodologies employ the entire sample instead of restricting
the sample to treated observations and a matched control sample. Thus, they conﬁrm that
our results are not reliant on the exact subsamples chosen by the matching technology. For
brevity, we do not tabulate the results of the weighting and control function analyses. When
the nearest-neighbor match estimates are signiﬁcant, we provide the weighting and control
function estimates as a robustness check in the text. We also note (rare) cases in which the
sets of estimates disagree. In these cases, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant treatment eﬀects that are not
present using the match estimators. In our application, the match appears to provide a more
conservative set of results.
3.2 Stock Returns
Our ﬁrst step toward understanding the impact of increases in CEO status on performance is to
measure the stock market reaction to CEO awards. For magazine awards, we use the cover date
of the magazine in which the award recipients were published as the event date. For awards
conferred by an organization, we use the date on which the winners were publicly announced.
We compute the cumulative abnormal returns around the event date, using a market model
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14with the CRSP value-weighted index as the proxy for market returns. We estimate α and β for
the award-winning ﬁrms using the three years ending 23 trading days prior to the event. As
the event window, we consider the eleven trading days surrounding the award announcement
(days [-5,+5] with day 0 as the event date).11 We also consider the long-run reaction over one
year ([+6,+255]), two years ([+6,+510]), and three years ([+6,+765]) following the award.
Panel I of Table 3 contains the results. The left two columns show the average CARs in the
samples of Award Winners (A) and Predicted Winners (P). Column 3 reports the cross-sample
diﬀerence; Column 4 adjusts the diﬀerence for bias due to diﬀerences in the propensity scores
of winners and matches; and Column 5 rematches directly on the characteristics (including
industry), adjusting for bias due to diﬀerences across winners and their matches. The last
speciﬁcation allows us to verify that the signiﬁcant diﬀerences between winners and propensity-
score matched Predicted Winners in CEO tenure and returns in months 13 to 36 do not drive
our results.
We ﬁnd no evidence of a short-term market reaction to awards, possibly due to the lack of a
precise event date. However, we ﬁnd strong evidence that winners underperform in the long
run. Their average CARs are signiﬁcantly smaller (more negative) than those of Predicted
Winners over the one, two, or three years following the award. Economically, the diﬀerence
in underperformance between winners and Predicted Winners ranges from 15% to 26% over
three years, depending on the speciﬁcation.
As robustness checks, we construct the propensity-score weighting and control function esti-
mators described in Section 3.1. The results are similar both in magnitude and signiﬁcance.
At the three-year horizon, the propensity-score weighting estimate is −0.223 (p-value = 0.001)
and the control function estimate is −0.155 (p-value = 0.026). We also redo the analysis taking
a portfolio approach. We construct a zero-investment strategy that is long in award winners
and short in Predicted Winners. In updating the portfolio, we drop ﬁrms when the CEO
leaves the company.12 The analysis of the zero-investment strategy does not incorporate any
11We consider a relatively long short-run window because it is diﬃcult to measure precisely the time at which
information about the award enters the market. For example, magazines routinely ship prior to their cover
dates, informing subscribers substantially before our event date.
12The results are qualitatively similar ignoring CEO exit and, if anything, weaker, suggesting that the under-
performance is tied to the award-winning CEO.
15backward-looking measure of expected returns, but simply compares average performance of
winners and Predicted Winners controlling for known patterns in returns. Note, however, that
the portfolio strategy is not fully implementable since it uses forward-looking information to
estimate the ﬁrst-stage logit on the entire sample of awards. The most natural fully imple-
mentable alternative, namely, to estimate a separate ﬁrst-stage logit for each “award month”
using only data from that month and before, is not feasible since there is only one winner in
any particular award month for some awards.
We run a time series regression of the value-weighted average portfolio return on the three
Fama-French (1993) factors — size (smb), book-to-market (hml), and market excess returns
(retrf) — and the momentum factor (Carhart, 1997). We ﬁnd that the portfolio has an alpha
of roughly 50 basis points per month over one, two, and three years following the award
month. The eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 5% level when ﬁr m sr e m a i ni nt h ep o r t f o l i of o rt h r e e
years following an award or Predicted Award. Economically, this translates to roughly 18%
underperformance of winners relative to Predicted Winners, consistent with the results from
the CAR estimations. We also ﬁnd that the momentum factor loads signiﬁcantly at all three
horizons. However, as we have seen in Table 1, this ﬁnding does not reﬂect signiﬁcant diﬀerences
at the time of the award in short-horizon past returns, nor does it alter our conclusion, given
the results from the other speciﬁcations.
Predictable long-run stock underperformance is challenging to interpret. In an eﬃcient market,
investors should incorporate bad news into stock prices at announcement. In order to test
whether the stock underperformance reﬂects deteriorating operating performance and lower
ﬁrm value, we will test for changes in ROA and other real corporate outcomes following CEO
awards. If increases in status cause CEOs to make value-destroying decisions, we should ﬁnd
evidence of declining earnings and of the underlying economic mechanisms.
3.3 Operating Performance
We measure changes in ROA around CEO awards, beginning at the end of the last ﬁscal year
prior to an award month and ending three years later. The top panel of Figure 2 graphs
ROA over this interval for award winners, Predicted Winners, and all non-winning CEOs. The
pattern among Predicted Winners and all non-winners is strikingly similar: it slopes down
16(modestly) with a slight dip at the end of the ﬁrst full ﬁscal year following an award month.
Award winners, however, have a decidedly diﬀerent pattern. While ROA among award winners
and Predicted Winners is nearly the same in the year prior to the event (both are signiﬁcantly
higher than non-winners), there is a clear downward trend in performance over the entire
interval among award winners.
In Panel A of Table 4, we quantify and test the signiﬁcance of these patterns. Column 1 reports
changes in ROA for award winners, using the last ﬁscal year prior to the award as the base
year. The diﬀerence in ROA from the ﬁrst to the last year of the interval is four percentage
points, which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Among predicted winners (Column
2), the three year change is a little less than half as large, but still signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
The diﬀerence in diﬀerences (Column 3) is insigniﬁcant. The result is similar if we adjust for
bias due to diﬀerences in propensity scores between winners and Predicted Winners or if we
include the lag of ROA as a match variable in addition to the propensity score.
Given the similarity in the paths of ROA between Predicted Winners and non-winners, we
also check the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence between the three year change in ROA of award
winners and all non-winners. Here, the test is more powerful since the mean is measured with
more precision in the larger non-winner sample. The diﬀerence (−0.026) is indeed statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Thus our failure to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between winners and
Predicted Winners despite the large economic eﬀect is likely due to a lack of power. Moreover,
we will see in Section 3.5 that the lack of signiﬁcance is partially due to averaging the eﬀect
over good and bad governance ﬁrms.
3.4 CEO Compensation
Award-winning CEOs underperform after attaining increased status, even beyond the eﬀects of
mean reversion. Next, we ask what the CEO does diﬀerently compared to what he did before
and compared to matched non-winners. First, we consider whether CEOs are able to use their
increased power to extract more rents from the company after winning awards. In this section,
we test for increased compensation. Extraction, however, could also be in the form of perks,
like airplanes or mansions (Yermack, 2006; Liu and Yermack, 2007), or in more subtle forms
like increases in ﬁrm contributions to the CEO’s favorite charities, increases in the frequency
17and size of corporate loans to the CEO, or initiation of costly sports stadium sponsorships.
As in Section 3.3, we consider the interval beginning at the end of the last ﬁscal year prior
to an award month and ending three years later. In the second row of panels in Figure 2,
we graph mean CEO total compensation and cash compensation for award winners, Predicted
Winners, and all non-winning CEOs. Like ROA, both award winners and Predicted Winners
have signiﬁcantly higher total and cash compensation than the sample of all non-winners prior
to the award, but no signiﬁcant diﬀerences to each other. Among award winners, there is an
immediate and striking increase in total compensation at the time of the CEO award: the
increase in total compensation from the last ﬁscal year ending at least 6 months prior to the
a w a r dt ot h ee n do ft h eﬁscal year containing the award is 44%.13 Neither Predicted Winners
nor the sample of all non-winners enjoy a signiﬁcant increase in total compensation over the
same interval. We do not see a parallel jump in cash compensation among award-winning
CEOs. Instead, both winners and Predicted Winners experience (indistinguishable) mildly
increasing paths of cash compensation over the three year interval.
In Panel B of Table 4, we quantify these patterns. The mean immediate increase in total
compensation among award winners ($7.816M) is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. There is an in-
signiﬁcant decrease ($829K) over the same interval among Predicted Winners. We also test
the signiﬁcance of the cross-group diﬀerence. Recall that our match already controls for dif-
ferences in characteristics like ﬁrm size, performance, age, and tenure, which are important
determinants of compensation levels. Thus, in Column 3, we test the signiﬁcance of the dif-
ference in means, without further adjustment. It is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
In Column 4, we adjust for bias due to diﬀerences in propensity scores between winners and
their matches and ﬁnd only a negligible impact on the result. Finally, in Column 5, we add
the lag of compensation as an additional match variable to proxy for potential diﬀerences in
the determinants of compensation levels across winners and Predicted Winners that the match
variables fail to capture. Again, the results are largely unaﬀected. We also ﬁnd some evidence,
particularly at the three-year horizon, that the compensation diﬀerences between winners and
Predicted Winners remain signiﬁcant over longer horizons. Turning to cash compensation, the
13Note that “Year of Award” gives the value of the outcome variable at the end of the ﬁscal year in which
the CEO won the (predicted) award. Most ﬁrms end the ﬁscal year in December, but the bulk of awards occur
in January (Business Week, Morningstar)a n dM a r c ho rA p r i l( Financial World, Forbes), leaving ample time
for compensation to respond to the award within the ﬁscal year.
18formal hypothesis tests conﬁrm that (1) there is a signiﬁcant three-year increase in cash com-
pensation both for winners and Predicted Winners and (2) there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
over any horizon or using any methodology between winners and their matches.
The results are qualitatively similar using the propensity score weighting and control function
approaches. In both cases, the immediate increase in total compensation is signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent for winners and non-winners (weighting estimate of diﬀerence = 6,455.26,p - v a l u e=
0.002; control function estimate = 6,202.24,p - v a l u e< 0.001). The diﬀerences decline as the
horizon increases. Using the weighting estimator, the diﬀerence is marginally signiﬁcant at
the two-year horizon and insigniﬁcant at the three-year horizon (p-value = 0.191). Using the
control function estimator, the diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at all horizons.
Summing up, we ﬁnd that award winners experience abnormal and signiﬁcant increases in total
compensation, but not in cash compensation.14 The increases are immediate and, though they
diminish somewhat, remain signiﬁcant over a three year horizon. One possible interpretation
is that ﬁrms increase equity-based compensation to oﬀset increased agency problems following
increases in CEO status. Under this interpretation, the increases in compensation are good
for claimholders. However, it is diﬃcult to reconcile this story with the underperformance of
award winners over the same interval and to understand why increases in performance pay are
not even partially oﬀset by decreases in ﬁxed pay. An alternative interpretation is that award-
winning CEOs use their increased power to extract greater rents in the form of equity-based
compensation. Rent extraction is most likely to occur in the form of equity-based compensation
(and particularly stock option grants) since these less transparent forms of compensation are
less likely to violate the shareholders’ “outrage constraint” (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003).
Finally, we plot the ratio of CEO total (cash) compensation to total (cash) compensation of
the next highest paid executive in the ﬁrm (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). As with compen-
sation levels, we consider the three year interval beginning with the last ﬁscal year to end at
least six months prior to the award month and analyze (separately) award winners, Predicted
Winners, and all non-winning CEOs. The bottom panels of Figure 2 show the results. We ﬁnd
14We do ﬁnd some evidence using the weighting and control function estimators that the diﬀerence between
winners and non-winners in cash compensation over the three-year horizon is positive and signiﬁcant. Here,
the control samples look similar to the unadjusted, full non-winner sample from Figure 2, suggesting that the
nearest-neighbor match may better control for selection eﬀects.
19that, among award winners, the ratio increases over the interval. Thus, the increase in total
compensation enjoyed by award winners is not shared by the next-highest paid executives in
their ﬁrm. For Predicted Winners and for the full sample of non-winning CEOs, instead, there
are no major changes in this ratio over time. We also test the signiﬁcance of these patterns
(untabulated). The diﬀerence between the change in total compensation ratios among winners
and Predicted Winners is statistically signiﬁcant over the short run, but not over the three-year
horizon.15 However, the increase in the total compensation ratio among award winners is not
itself statistically signiﬁcant, reﬂecting the high variance of the ratio of two noisy compensa-
tion measures. Nevertheless, the pattern is broadly supportive of an important role for CEO
power or status: only award-winning CEOs receive increased compensation following strong
performance, not other CEOs with equally strong performance and not other executives in the
award winner’s ﬁrm.
3.5 Corporate Governance
Thus far our results suggest that CEO awards decrease value for claimholders. In this section,
we test whether the underperformance and increased compensation of award winners diﬀers
depending on the ﬁrm’s governance structure. If the underperformance indeed arises from
increased abuses by the CEO, then the eﬀects are likely to be concentrated in ﬁrms with
weaker shareholder protection and more entrenched management.
We use the governance index (GIM) of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) to measure the
strength of corporate governance. The GIM index counts the number of charter provisions
that insulate management from takeover pressure, such as staggered boards and poison pills.
The ﬁrms with the highest values of the index have the weakest shareholder rights (or most
entrenched management). We use the 33rd and 66th percentile of the distribution of the index
among award winners to split the sample into three subgroups.16 We then redo the analysis
of Sections 3.2-3.4, separately on each subsample. By re-matching within each governance
category, we ensure that good (poor) governance ﬁrms can only match to other good (poor)
15The three-year diﬀerences between winners and non-winners in the compensation ratio are signiﬁcant in
most speciﬁcations using the weighting- and control-function estimators.
16The split does not result in equal numbers of award winners in each subsample since there are discrete
masses of observations at the cutpoints. Our results are robust to minor changes in the cutpoints.
20governance ﬁrms. Thus, the resulting diﬀerences in outcomes across the treated and control
sample can be interpreted as the eﬀect of the award within ﬁrms of that governance type and
are distinct from any direct eﬀect of governance on the outcome in question.
Table 5 presents the results for ﬁrms with good governance (GIM≤7) in Columns 1 and 2; for
ﬁrms with intermediate governance in Columns 3 and 4; and for ﬁrms with bad governance
(GIM>9) in Column 5 and 6. For brevity, we focus on the signiﬁcant diﬀerences in performance
and compensation from the prior sections For operating performance and compensation, we
also report bias-adjusted diﬀerences including the lagged outcome as an additional match
variable (Columns 2, 4, and 6).
In rows 1 to 3, we present diﬀerences in stock performance over the one, two, and three years
following an award month. We ﬁnd that the underperformance of award winners relative to Pre-
dicted Winners is only present among poorly governed ﬁrms. Moreover, relative performance
seems to deteriorate monotonically as we move from the good to the bad governance subsam-
ple. Turning to operating performance, we ﬁnd a similar pattern. The three-year decline in
ROA is signiﬁcantly larger for winners than Predicted Winners in the bad-governance sample
(though it becomes insigniﬁcant controlling for the lag of ROA). Among good governance ﬁrms,
instead, ROA improves (insigniﬁcantly) for winners relative to Predicted Winners. Again, the
diﬀerence declines monotonically across the subsamples. Finally, we examine the compensa-
tion eﬀects. The one-year change in total compensation is signiﬁcantly larger for winners than
Predicted Winners in ﬁrms with poor governance. The diﬀerences are small and insigniﬁcant in
good-governance ﬁrms and, again, increase monotonically across the subsamples. As a placebo,
we examine the eﬀect of governance on cash compensation. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between winners and Predicted Winners in any subsample.
As in prior sections, we ﬁnd similar results using the propensity score weighting or control
function approaches on the governance subsamples. The lone notable deviation is in the diﬀer-
ence between winners and non-winners in cumulative abnormal stock returns. Here, we do not
replicate the modest, but insigniﬁcant improvement in performance among good governance
ﬁrms for winners relative to non winners. Instead, the point estimates of the diﬀerences are
typically negative.17
17The diﬀerence is marginally signiﬁcant using control functions over the three-year horizon. Among
21Overall, we ﬁnd that the long-run underperformance of award winners and the immediate
increases in their equity-based compensation are concentrated in ﬁrms with weak pre-existing
corporate governance. These results support the view that increases in status captured by
major media awards lead to rent extraction and worse job performance by CEOs. They also
provide a silver lining: award-winning CEOs in ﬁrms with strong corporate governance display
modest, though insigniﬁcant, improvements in performance relative to matched non-winning
CEOs.
4 Distractions
The results of the previous section suggest that increased rent extraction partially explains the
underperformance of award winners. In this section, we explore a second potential mechanism
generating underperformance. We test whether award-winning CEOs increase the frequency
with which they engage in activities outside the ﬁrm which may distract attention from max-
imizing ﬁrm value. We focus on two such activities: writing memoirs and other books and
sitting on outside boards. We also provide some suggestive evidence on leisure activity (golf
handicaps).
Methodologically, the low frequency of books and board changes does not allow us to repli-
cate the estimation procedure we use to measure changes in performance and compensation.
Matching CEOs on the frequency with which they engage in outside activities prior to each
award month would require suﬃciently long pre-award and post-award windows, e.g., in order
to match on the average number of books per year over the three years prior to the award
month and to measure subsequent changes in behavior. The limited samples of CEO books
(85) and board seats (only since 1994) restrict the pool of potential matches and prevent such
an estimation. An additional complication is that authoring books or assuming board seats
occur at diﬀerent times relative to the award month for each individual (unlike, e.g., stock
performance), making it more diﬃcult to control for confounding predictors of the outcome in
the matching speciﬁcation.
Instead of the matching methodology, we rely on ordinary least squares and ﬁxed eﬀects regres-
intermediate-governance ﬁrms, the diﬀerences are typically insigniﬁcantly positive.
22sions. As a result, the control group is either all non-winning CEOs or the pre-award behavior
of the winners themselves. We also introduce an additional source of variation by measuring
the marginal impact of each successive award for CEOs who win multiple awards. We include
controls for ﬁrm size, performance, and CEO characteristics. Finally, we examine the interac-
tions of the award eﬀects with corporate governance. If outside tasks distract CEOs from ﬁrm
business, then we should expect more outside involvement in ﬁrms with weaker governance.
In our data, we observe two main types of books: memoirs and strategy books. Such books
can serve as a marketing tool and thereby increase ﬁrm value. Most CEO-authored books,
however, focus more on the virtues of the CEO than the company. Thus, it appears reasonable
to equate authoring such books more with perk consumption than with maximizing shareholder
value. For example, Andrew Grove of Intel writes three books during our sample period: two
in the “strategy” category (High Output Management and Only the Paranoid Survive)a n do n e
am e m o i r( Swimming Across: A Memoir). Of the latter, Amazon.com writes: “In Swimming
Across, a true American hero reveals his origins and what it takes to survive...and to triumph.”
In the top panel of Figure 3, we plot the likelihood of writing a book against the number of
awards a CEO has won in the past. The baseline probability of a CEO writing a book in any
given ﬁrm year is low (0.0037). However, having won an award in the past nearly doubles the
likelihood of authoring a book. For the biggest superstars — CEOs who have won three or more
awards in the past — the likelihood of writing a book in a given ﬁrm year is more than three
times higher than the baseline probability in the full sample of CEO years.
In Table 6, we examine these patterns in a regression framework. In Column 1, we regress the
number of books per year on the CEO’s award history: we include indicators for having won
at least x awards in the past, where x ranges from 1 to 3. We control for ﬁrm size (the natural
log of market capitalization), ﬁrm performance (book-to-market ratio), CEO age, CEO tenure,
and ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects.18 The ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects capture variation in the type of ﬁrm
in which managers write books. For example, CEO authors may be more common in ﬁrms
with popular consumer products. The year eﬀects capture time series variation in consumer
taste for CEO books. The controls are generally not signiﬁcant. The pattern of the coeﬃcients
18We exclude the CEO gender control since only one female CEO in our sample, Lillian Vernon of Lillian
Vernon Corp, authors a book.
23on the award dummies mirrors Figure 3. Though the positive marginal eﬀect of winning the
ﬁrst award is not statistically signiﬁcant, the marginal impact of each additional award is also
positive and larger in magnitude. As a result, the cumulative impact of winning at least 3
awards is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (p-value = 0.0064).
In Columns 2 - 4, we re-estimate the regression separately for ﬁr m si ne a c ho ft h et h r e e
corporate governance regimes deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n3 . 5 .I nﬁrms with strong corporate governance
(GIM≤ 7), we ﬁnd that neither the marginal nor the cumulative eﬀect of awards is signiﬁcant.
For ﬁrms with intermediate values of the governance index, the marginal eﬀect of a second
award is signiﬁcantly positive, but the eﬀect of winning at least 3 awards is not signiﬁcant.
Among ﬁrms with weak governance (GIM> 9), however, the marginal and cumulative eﬀects
of winning at least 3 awards are signiﬁcantly positive (the p-value for the cumulative eﬀect is
< 0.001). Thus, the likelihood of CEOs becoming serial authors—like Andrew Grove—increases
as the number of awards increases, but primarily when the quality of governance is also poor.
We perform a parallel analysis of the number of external board seats CEOs assume. Serving
on outside boards entails a tradeoﬀ between value-increasing networking opportunities and
time that could be spent on internal ﬁrm business. As an external director, the CEO has to
prepare for and travel to board meetings and communicate outside the meetings with the CEO
and other board members. Corporate governance ratings and best practices guidelines from
watchdogs such as the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) suggest that the distraction
eﬀect dominates when the CEO sits on ﬁve or more external boards.19 Thus, we use an
indicator for sitting on ﬁve or more external boards as a distraction measure.
In the lower panel of Figure 3, we plot the frequency of sitting on at least ﬁve outside boards
against the number of prior awards. In this case, the main impact appears to occur with the
ﬁrst award. Award-winning CEOs are roughly twice as likely to sit on ﬁve or more boards
than non-winning CEOs (6.8% vs. 3.2%), but the graph is relatively ﬂat as we increase the
number of past awards from one to three.
In Column 5 to 8 of Table 6, we measure the eﬀects in a regression framework. As before, we
include ﬁrm size, ﬁrm performance, CEO age, CEO tenure, and ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects as
19Five or more board seats negatively aﬀect corporate governance measures such as the Corporate Governance
Quotient of ISS.
24controls. Here, the ﬁrm eﬀects capture diﬀerences in demand for a CEO as an outside director
depending on the ﬁrm he manages, and the year eﬀects capture time series patterns in the
overall demand for CEO-directors. Among the controls, we ﬁnd that CEO age and tenure
signiﬁcantly increase the likelihood of serving on at least ﬁve boards. We also ﬁnd that CEOs
in ‘value ﬁrms’ (i.e., ﬁrms with low book-to-market ratios) are more likely to sit on outside
boards, though the economic magnitude of the eﬀect is small. (Decreasing book-to-market by
one standard deviation increases the likelihood of sitting on at least ﬁve boards by roughly
0.005.) Most importantly, the estimates conﬁrm the pattern from Figure 3: only the ﬁrst
award has a (marginally) signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the likelihood of assuming at least ﬁve
board seats. And, as shown in Columns 6 to 8, the positive impact comes entirely from the
weak governance subsample (GIM> 9).
We perform several robustness checks on the books and board-seats evidence. Both results are
qualitatively similar if we include CEO ﬁxed eﬀects: CEOs who win awards are more likely to
write books or to sit on a large number of external boards after they win awards, particularly
when governance is weak. However, the results are generally not robust to clustering the
standard errors at the ﬁrm level. The relative rarity of the outcomes makes it challenging to
identify an award eﬀect on books or board seats. Thus, we must interpret these results with
some caution.
As a ﬁnal measure of CEOs’ propensity to engage in activities that distract attention from
ﬁrm business, we look at golf handicaps. In general, as CEOs play more golf their handicaps
should decrease. We collect information on golf handicaps from the CEO rankings published
by Golf Digest in 1998, 2000 and 2002. The short time series of data does not allow us
to (systematically) identify changes in handicaps among award-winning CEOs. We do ﬁnd,
however, that award-winning CEOs have lower handicaps on average than their peers (14.29 vs.
15.46; diﬀerence p-value = 0.097). Moreover, the absolute diﬀerence in handicaps is largest in
ﬁrms with poor corporate governance and declines monotonically to 0 as governance improves
(GIM> 9:d i ﬀerence = -1.833, p = 0.092; 7 <GIM≤ 9:d i ﬀerence = -0.774, p = 0.540; GIM≤ 7:
diﬀerence = -0.075, p = 0.958). These cross-sectional patterns are consistent with powerful
CEOs spending time on the golf course that shareholders would prefer them to spend on ﬁrm
business.
255 Earnings Management
If award-winning CEOs use their status to extract rents or to devote time to distractive perks,
they may ﬁnd it increasingly diﬃcult to meet or exceed market and analyst expectations. Our
return results show not only that award winners underperform but also that the market does
not seem to anticipate the subsequent underperformance. Hence, in order to avoid repeatedly
missing analyst forecasts, award-winning CEOs may engage in active earnings management.
We test this hypothesis using two measures of earnings management from DeGeorge, Patel, and
Zeckhauser (1999). One measure is the incidence of exactly meeting analyst earnings forecasts,
i.e., of zero earnings surprises. A second measure is the left-skewness of the earnings surprise
distribution. “Extra mass” in the earnings surprise distribution at 0 or 1c / and more mass ‘just
to the right’ of 0 than ‘just to the left’ are interpreted as signs of management ﬁne-tuning the
earnings numbers (or exerting pressure on analysts).
In Figure 4, we plot the mean deviation between quarterly earnings announcements and the
consensus analyst forecast, separately for CEOs who have won 1, 2, 3, or 4 awards in the
past. We measure the consensus forecast as the median forecast among all analysts who make
a forecast in the 30 calendar days prior to the announcement. In each ﬁgure, we include
the distribution of earnings surprises in the complementary set of CEOs as a benchmark.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we ﬁnd that award winners are more likely to just meet or
barely exceed expectations than they should be under a symmetric distribution of earnings
realizations. Moreover, the distribution among award winners is less symmetric than among
non-winners and the deviation generally increases with the number of awards. Economically,
among CEOs with at least 1 award, there is a roughly 3.5 percentage point higher frequency
of reporting a zero earnings surprise; among CEOs with at least 4 awards, the increase is more
than 10 percentage points.
In Table 7, we test the pattern in a regression framework. We focus on the probability that
a ﬁrm experiences an earnings surprise of exactly zero. We adapt our empirical speciﬁcation
from Section 4, with controls for ﬁrm size, ﬁrm performance (book-to-market ratio), CEO
age and CEO tenure. Following DellaVigna and Pollet (2004), we allow for a non-linear size
eﬀect by including 10 indicator variables for deciles of market capitalization at the time of the
26earnings announcement.20 Since the data is quarterly, we include month eﬀects in addition to
the year eﬀects to control for cross-sectional correlation of earnings surprises at diﬀerent points
in time. We also cluster the standard errors by earnings announcement date.21 Finally, we
include CEO ﬁxed eﬀects to separate the impact of winning awards from a (potentially) higher
baseline propensity to manage earnings among award-winning CEOs. We also verify that the
results are robust to including the number of analysts covering a ﬁrm as an additional control
(untabulated).
The full-sample results are in Column 1. Among the controls, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with lower
book-to-market ratios are more likely to report zero earnings surprises. The other controls
do not have signiﬁcant eﬀects. The pattern among the award dummies is consistent with the
evidence in Figure 4. The marginal eﬀect of winning the ﬁrst award is positive and signiﬁ-
cant at the 1% level: CEOs increase earnings management after they win an award. There
is no signiﬁcant additional impact of the second or third award, but a large and signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect of the fourth award. The cumulative increase in the frequency of zero surprises
among CEOs with at least 4 prior awards is roughly 10 percentage points and is statistically
signiﬁcant (p-value = 0.025). In Columns 2 - 4, we re-estimate the regression on the three
corporate-governance subsamples (GIM≤ 7, 7 <GIM≤ 9,a n dG I M > 9). In ﬁrms with strong
governance, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant impact of CEO awards on the likelihood of reporting a zero
surprise. In the intermediate range, there is some evidence of increased earnings management
among winners: the cumulative eﬀect of winning at least 4 awards on the likelihood of reporting
a zero surprise is roughly 17 percentage points and is statistically signiﬁcant (p-value = 0.084).
Among ﬁrms with poor corporate governance, the eﬀect of one award is strong and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. The eﬀect reverses and becomes negative for CEOs winning two awards, but
the cumulative eﬀect of at least four awards remains positive and economically large (roughly
15 percentage points), though marginally insigniﬁcant (p-value = 0.137). Overall, the evi-
dence suggests that award-winning CEOs increase their frequency of earnings management,
particularly when corporate governance is weak.
Finally, we ﬁnd that CEOs are not able to follow this strategy indeﬁnitely. In untabulated
20The coeﬃcients of the award dummies are largely unaﬀected if we use instead a continuous size control.
21The results are qualitatively unchanged if we instead cluster at the ﬁrm level to correct for autocorrelation
of earnings surprises.
27estimations, we measure the frequency with which CEOs report negative earnings. Overall,
negative earnings reports are a rare event, occurring less than 10% of the time, and there
are few signiﬁcant diﬀerences between award-winning and non-winning CEOs. However, once
ﬁve years have passed since the winning CEO’s last award, the frequency of negative earnings
announcements is signiﬁcantly higher than among non-winning CEOs.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We use major awards in the national media to measure the impact of increases in CEO sta-
tus on corporate performance and other corporate outcomes. Our main ﬁndings are that (1)
ﬁrms with award-winning CEOs suﬀer declining performance, (2) award-winning CEOs extract
higher compensation, largely in the form of stock and options, (3) increases in CEO compen-
sation following awards are not shared by other top executives in the ﬁrm, (4) award-winning
CEOs indulge in tasks which provide private beneﬁts but little (if any) ﬁrm value (writing
books, sitting on outside boards, playing golf), and (5) award-winning CEOs increase earnings
management and are signiﬁcantly more likely to report negative earnings ﬁve years after their
l a s ta w a r d .A l lo ft h e s ee ﬀects are concentrated in the subsample of poorly governed ﬁrms.
Hence, the drastic increase in the quantity and prominence of CEO awards over the past
two decades and, more generally, the celebrity culture permeating the business world has
clear consequences for shareholders: increased status distorts CEO behavior and aﬀects ﬁrm
performance. However, the negative eﬀects can be avoided if strong corporate governance
institutions are in place. Moreover, the good performance of award-winning CEOs prior to
the award suggests that the implicit tournament for media recognition may mitigate agency
problems inside the ﬁrms ex ante, inducing value-maximizing decisions.
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31Figure 1. CEO Awards by Year. E&Y.E are Ernst & Young Entrepreneurs of the Year. TIME.IGE are Time/CNN Most Influential Global Executives. EBM are Electronic Business Magazine CEOs of the year.
Morningstar are Morningstar.com CEOs of the year. TIME.POY are winners of the Time Person of the Year award. Forbes are Forbes Best Performing CEOs. IW are Industry Week CEOs of the year (from the
Annual CEO Survey) for years in which the winners are not broken into categories. IW.SS are Industry Week CEOs of the year in the "Services Sector." IW.IS are Industry Week CEOs of the year in the "Industrial
Sector." IW.HI are Industry Week CEOs of the year in the "Heavy Industry Companies" category. IW.HT are Industry Week CEOs of the year in the "High-tech Companies" category. IW.F are Industry Week CEOs 
of the year in the "Finance and Other Companies" category. IW.CG are Industry Week CEOs of the year in the "Consumer Goods" category. BW.BE are Business Week Best Entrepreneur awards. BW.BM are












































SilversFigure 2. Operating Performance and Compensation of Award Winners. Predicted Winners are chosen using a nearest-neighbor propensity-score match with
controls for firm size; book-to-market ratio; returns 2-to-3, 4-to-6, 7-to-12, and 13-to-36 months prior to the award month; CEO age; CEO tenure; CEO gender; and
Fama-French 48 industry-, year-, and award-fixed effects. Matching is done in each month in which an award is conferred, with replacement. Year of Award is the end
of the fiscal year in which the award was conferred. ROA is income before extraordinary items plus interest expense, scaled by assets. Total Compensation (tdc1) is
salary plus bonus plus other annual plus restricted stock grants plus LTIP payouts plus all other plus value of options grants. Cash Compensation (tcc) is salary plus
bonus. Total and Cash Compensation are reported in $K. Total (Cash) Compensation Ratio is the ratio of the CEO's total (cash) compensation to the total (cash)



































































































All Non-WinnersFigure 3. CEO Awards and Distractions. Books measures the number of books the CEO published during
the fiscal year. At Least 5 Board Seats is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO sat on at least 5 outside
boards during the fiscal year. The figures count the number of awards the CEO has won in prior years,






























































ConstantFigure 4. CEO Awards and Earnings Management. Earnings surprise is the difference between the firm's quarterly earnings announcement and the median analyst forecast among all analysts that
make a forecast in the 30 calendar days prior to the announcement. The figures count the number of awards the CEO has won in prior years, inclusive of awards won in other companies.























































































Award WinnerObs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. p(W - A) p(W - P)
Match Variables:
264 9.636 9.676 1.579 60,356 7.079 6.939 1.602 264 9.689 9.988 1.655 0.000*** 0.709
264 0.377 0.307 0.304 60,356 0.581 0.482 0.626 264 0.411 0.321 0.309 0.000*** 0.192
264 0.068 0.055 0.186 60,356 0.034 0.027 0.207 264 0.066 0.046 0.203 0.007*** 0.872
264 0.075 0.070 0.198 60,356 0.020 0.011 0.244 264 0.068 0.046 0.190 0.000*** 0.671
264 0.268 0.156 0.608 60,356 0.106 0.068 0.380 264 0.328 0.108 1.076 0.000*** 0.432
264 1.137 0.498 2.997 60,356 0.604 0.281 1.792 264 0.724 0.474 1.461 0.000*** 0.045**
264 55.508 56 8.180 60,356 55.155 55 7.628 264 55.616 56 6.904 0.453 0.869
264 0.015 0 0.122 60,356 0.011 0 0.106 264 0.022 0 0.140 0.567 0.542
264 9.708 8 7.346 60,356 8.362 6 7.539 264 8.569 7 7.027 0.004*** 0.069*
264 53,563.76 11,858.04 138,544.40 60,350 9,612.28 1,249.60 41,624.75 264 50,594.96 20,013.96 107,002.70 0.000*** 0.783
264 20,753.49 9,266.53 30,185.48 60,346 4,014.42 1,071.50 10,879.21 264 23,904.41 13,959.00 31,012.16 0.000*** 0.237
246 0.10 0.09 0.06 53,970 0.05 0.07 0.14 251 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.000*** 0.114
264 0.20 0.18 0.43 60,251 0.09 0.11 4.92 264 0.17 0.16 0.23 0.731 0.441
264 3.68 1.94 6.16 60,261 2.01 1.42 1.94 264 3.15 1.99 4.02 0.000*** 0.243
263 0.590 0.616 0.324 60,308 0.650 0.663 0.321 263 0.605 0.593 0.268 0.003*** 0.560
207 -0.044 -0.044 0.082 52,219 -0.039 -0.043 0.087 217 0.004 -0.044 0.063 0.418 0.550
252 9.067 9 2.558 48,782 9.361 9 2.736 258 8.777 9 2.653 0.089* 0.208
254 0.496 0 0.501 53,703 0.709 1 0.454 254 0.455 0 0.468 0.000*** 0.342
262 0.040 0.002 0.100 58,725 0.031 0.004 0.078 264 0.029 0.001 0.088 0.058* 0.165
231 13,289.66 5,054.80 29,774.55 52,325 4,048.15 1,646.06 13,870.43 229 10,111.22 3,947.94 21,419.98 0.000*** 0.190
236 2,383.86 1,644.39 2,577.64 53,654 1,116.59 791.30 1,609.53 234 2,177.50 1,530.76 2,083.46 0.000*** 0.341
231 1.93 1.58 1.48 52,212 1.87 1.57 1.81 229 2.05 1.64 1.94 0.597 0.473
236 1.70 1.52 0.88 53,609 1.66 1.54 1.39 234 1.77 1.60 0.97 0.613 0.463
260 0.158 0 0.37 54,988 0.26 0 0.44 261 0.210 0 0.377 0.000*** 0.110
5% 3% C. NonD 5% Telecom. 2% C. NonD 4% Telecom. 5%
7% 4% C. Dur 3% Utilities 7% C. Dur 5% Utilities 9%
8% 0% Man. 12% Shops 0% Man. 5% Shops 0%
3% 6% Energy 5% Health 7% Energy 2% Health 10%
2% 14% Chem. 4% Money 13% Chem. 5% Money 12%
27% 22% Bus. Eq. 16% Other 26% Bus. Eq. 29% Other 15% Other
Health

















Table 1. Summary Statistics
Market Capitalization (price * shares outstanding) is measuredtwo months prior to the award month and is in log form.Book-to-Market Ratio is book equity overmarketcapitalization. Returns_x_y are the total compound returns fromthe y
th to the x
th month
prior to the award month. Net Operating Assets (NOA) are operating assets minus operating liabilities, scaled by the lag of book assets. Accruals are the change in current assets minus the change in cash and short-term investmentsminus depreciation and
amortization minus the quantity the change in liabilites minus the change in debt in current liabilities minus the change in incometaxes payable, scaled by the lag of book assets. NOA and Accrualsare winsorized at the 1% levelin the overall sample. Total
Compensation (tdc1) is salary plus bonus plus other annual plus restricted stock grants plus LTIP payouts plus all other plus value of options grants. Cash Compensation (tcc) is salary plus bonus. Total and Cash Compensation are reported in $K. Total (Cash)  
Months with CEO Awards
Differences in Means CEO Award Winners (W) All Non-Award Winners (A) Predicted Winners (P)
Compensation ratio is the ratio of the CEO's total (cash) compensationto the total (cash) compensationof the next highest paid executivein the firm.GovernanceIndex(GIM)is constructed as in Gompers,Ishii, and Metrick (2003). Institutional Blockholder is
constructed as in Cremersand Nair (2004). Book-to-Market Ratio, Total Compensation,Cash Compenstion, Total CompensationRatio, and Cash CompensationRatio, Net OperatingAssets and Accrualsare measuredat the end of the mostrecent fiscal yearthat
ends at least six months prior to the award month. ROA (incomebefore extraordinaryitems plus interest expense, scaled by asets), ROE (net income,scaled by book equity), and Q (assets plus marketequity minus book equity, scaled by assets) are measuredat
the end of the most recent fiscal year that ends prior to the award. 













































Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 2. Determinants of Award Winners
The sample includes all firms in each month in which a CEO award was
given. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO
of the company won the award. Market Capitalization (price * shares
outstanding) is measured two months prior to the award month and is in
log form. Book-to-Market Ratio is book equity over market capitalization
and is measured at the end of the last fiscal year to end at least six months
prior to the award month. Returns_x_y are the total compound returns
from the y
th to the x
th month prior to the award month. Coefficients are













Event Window [-5,+5] -0.002 -0.006 0.005 0.005 0.003
(0.35) (1.37) (0.65) (0.61) (0.57)
Event Window [+6,+255] -0.183 -0.101 -0.082 -0.082 0.024 
(7.03)*** (4.48)*** (2.38)** (2.44)** (0.94)
Event Window [+6,+510] -0.404 -0.235 -0.169 -0.168 -0.077
(9.43)*** (5.68)*** (2.84)*** (2.77)*** (1.97)**
Event Window [+6,+765] -0.607 -0.349 -0.257 -0.256 -0.147
(10.42)*** (6.14)*** (3.16)*** (3.09)*** (2.69)***
1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
mktrf 0.125 0.055 0.052
(1.23) (0.68) (0.75)
smb -0.209 -0.110 -0.079
(2.01)** (1.34) (1.11)
hml -0.173 -0.178 -0.096
(1.35) (1.75)* (1.10)
umd 0.274 0.229 0.162
(3.86)*** (4.06)*** (3.35)***
alpha -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(1.16) (1.52) (1.99)**
Observations 141 143 143
R-squared 0.13 0.14 0.09
Table 3.  Stock Performance of Award Winners vs. Predicted Winners
II. Long Run Returns to Difference Portfolio
The dependentvariable is the value-weightedmonthly return to the portfoliothat is long award
winnersand shortpredictedwinners.Firms enterthe portfolioat the beginningofthe firstmonth
after the award date and exit 1, 2, or 3 years later or upon CEO exit. Alpha is the alpha from a
four-factormodel,mktrf is the market factor;smbthe sizefactor,hml the book-to-marketfactor,
and umd the momentum factor.
I. Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Awards and Predicted Awards
Predicted Winners (P) in Columns 2-4 are chosen using a nearest-neighborpropensity score match with controls for firm size, book-to-
market ratio, returns 2-to-3, 4-to-6, 7-to-12, and 13-to-36 monthsprior to the award month,CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO gender, and year-,
Fama-French48 industry-,and award-fixedeffects.Matching is done in each month in whichan award is conferred,with replacement.The
bias-adjustment (Column 4) accounts for differencesbetween the propensity scores of award winners and their nearest match. Column 5
matches on the characteristics directly, also bias-adjusted for differencesin characteristicsacross winners and their matches. Each sample
contains 264 observations. Windows are in trading days. Expected returns are calculated using a market model with the CRSP value-
weighted index as market returns and a three-year estimation period ending 23 trading days prior to the award date [-778,-23].












ROA [-1, 0] -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.000
(1.58) (1.25) (0.16) (0.57) (0.09)
ROA [-1, +1] -0.019 -0.023 0.004 0.001 0.000
(3.15)*** (2.29)** (0.37) (0.08) (0.01)
ROA [-1, +2] -0.040 -0.017 -0.023 -0.016 -0.020
(2.76)*** (2.52)** (1.43) (0.95) (1.25)
Total Compensation [-1, +0] 7,816.21 -829.75 8,645.96 8,577.07  8,017.35 
(2.16)** (0.57) (2.21)** (2.21)** (2.39)**
Total Compensation [-1, +1] 6,399.23 711.86 5,687.37 4,161.52 6,546.25
(1.59) (0.44) (1.33) (0.95) (1.65)*
Total Compensation [-1, +2] 7,332.71 2,329.09 5,003.62 3,992.49 5,856.76
(2.96)*** (1.53) (1.74)* (1.24) (2.39)**
Cash Compensation [-1, 0] 197.27  202.74  -5.465 -30.30 14.81
(1.53) (1.45) (0.03) (0.17) (0.09)
Cash Compensation [-1, +1] 454.01 660.10 -206.09 -135.03 14.60
(1.63) (6.15)*** (0.70) (0.45) (0.05)
Cash Compensation [-1, +2] 1,236.09 960.51 275.58 288.91 187.59
(3.45)*** (6.15)*** (0.72) (0.70) (0.48)
Table 4.  Operating Performance and Compensation Around CEO Awards
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Panel A. Performance
Panel B. CEO Compensation
ROA is income before extraordinary items plus interest expense, scaled by assets. Total Compensation (tdc1) is salary plus bonus plus other
annual plus restricted stock grants plus LTIP payouts plus all other plus value of options grants. Cash Compensation (tcc) is salary plus bonus.
Predicted Winners are chosen in columns 2 to 4 using a nearest-neighbor propensity-score match with controls for firm size; book-to-market
ratio; returns 2-to-3, 4-to-6, 7-to-12, and 13-to-36 months prior to the award month; CEO age; CEO tenure; CEO gender; and year-, Fama-
French 48 industry-, and award-fixed effects. The bias-adjustment accounts for differences between the propensity scores of award winners and
their nearest match. The final column re-matches on the propensity score and the lagged level of the outcome variable, adjusting for the bias
created by differences in propensity scores and the lagged outcome. Matching is done in each month in which an award is conferred, with
replacement. Windows are expressed in fiscal years. baseline with lag baseline with lag baseline with lag
CAR [6, 255] 0.110 n/a 0.004 n/a -0.127 n/a
(1.01) (0.08) (2.77)***
N=68 N=81 N=103
CAR [6, 510] 0.137 n/a -0.026 n/a -0.221 n/a
(0.78) (0.31) (2.93)***
N=68 N=81 N=103
CAR [6, 765] 0.066 n/a -0.041 n/a -0.229 n/a
(0.28) (0.38) (2.17)**
N=68 N=81 N=103
ROA [-1, +2] 0.036 0.004 0.017 0.014 -0.020 -0.011
(1.07) (0.11) (0.68) (0.99) (1.98)** (1.16)
N=53 N=53 N=56 N=56 N=87 N=87
Total Compensation [-1, 0] -831.18 357.39 5,483.33 7,140.69 9,412.38 8,741.06
(0.12) (0.08) (0.58) (0.79) (2.16)** (2.15)**
N=63 N=63 N=70 N=70 N=91 N=91
Cash Compensation [-1, 0] -247.20 -191.67 326.08 213.53 -100.69 -266.51
(0.85) (0.67) (0.79) (0.59) (0.62) (1.43)
N=64 N=64 N=71 N=71 N=94 N=94
Table 5. Performance and Compensation by Corporate Governance
Good Governance           
(GIM ≤ 7)
(7 < GIM ≤ 9)
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Bad Governance             
(GIM > 9)
CAR are cumulative abnormal returns, where expected returns are calculated using a market model with the CRSP value-weighted index as market returns and a three
year estimation period ending 23 trading days prior to the award date [-778,-23]. ROA is income before extraordinary items plus interest expense, scaled by assets.
Total Compensation (tdc1) is salary plus bonus plus other annual plus restricted stock grants plus LTIP payouts plus all other plus value of options grants. Cash
Compensation (tcc) is salary plus bonus. GIM is the governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). Estimates are the difference in the outcome variable
between award winners and Predicted Winners in each governance category. In Columns 1, 3, and 5, Predicted Winners are chosen using a nearest-neighbor propensity
score match with controls for firm size; book-to-market ratio; returns 2-to-3, 4-to-6, 7-to-12, and 13-to-36 months prior to the award month; CEO age; CEO tenure;
CEO gender; and year-, Fama-French 48 industry-, and award-fixed effects. The bias-adjustment accounts for differences between the propensity scores of award
winners and their nearest match. In Columns 2, 4, and 6, Predicted Winners are chosen by matching on the propensity score and the lagged level of the outcome
variable, adjusting for the bias created by differences in propensity scores and the lagged outcome. Matching is done in each month in which an award is conferred,
with replacement. CAR windows are expressed in trading days; all other windows are expressed in fiscal years. N is the number of award winners (and matches) in
each category.














At least 1 award 0.0022 0.0059 0.0060 -0.0025 0.0193 -0.0033 -0.0126 0.0471
(0.64) (0.56) (0.91) (0.50) (1.95)* (0.14) (0.54) (2.65)***
At least 2 awards 0.0083 -0.0019 0.0255 0.0017 -0.0206 -0.0513 0.0074 -0.0719
(1.10) (0.09) (2.42)** (0.11) (0.99) (1.15) (0.20) (1.44)
At least 3 awards 0.0093 0.0009 -0.0242 0.0496 0.0093 -0.0017 0.0906 -0.0797
(1.03) (0.04) (1.61) (2.92)*** (0.37) (0.03) (1.58) (1.37)
Book-to-Market Ratio -0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0067 -0.0064 -0.0285 -0.009
(0.51) (0.48) (0.44) (0.44) (2.53)** (0.95) (3.53)*** (1.23)
Market Capitalization -0.0001 -0.0021 -0.0013 0.0005 0.0003 0.0033 -0.0097 -0.0072
(0.15) (0.74) (0.67) (0.26) (0.13) (0.51) (1.41) (1.07)
CEO Age 0.0001 0.0005 0.0000 0.0003 0.0012 -0.0002 0.0041 0.0022
(1.06) (1.26) (0.07) (1.21) (3.19)*** (0.20) (4.07)*** (2.75)***
CEO Tenure -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0016 0.002 0.0020 0.0014
(1.05) (1.86)* (0.38) (0.15) (4.14)*** (2.22)** (2.06)** (1.84)*
Year Fixed Effects XXXX XXXX
Firm Fixed Effects XXXX XXXX
Observations 17,850 3,656 3,371 6,409 14,190 2,919 2,627 4,978
Number of Firms 2,421 818 827 1,032 2,381 774 777 1,005
R
2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 6. Distractions
Books At Least 5 Board Seats
Books measures the number of books the CEO published during the fiscal year. At Least 5 Board Seats is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO sat on at least five
outside boards during the fiscal year. Market Capitalization (price * shares outstanding) is taken at the end of the prior fiscal year and is in log form. Book-to-Market ratio
is book equity over Market Capitalization and is measured at the end of prior fiscal year (or the last fiscal year to end at least six months prior to the current fiscal year).
CEO Age and CEO Tenure are measured in years. The Award Dummies measure the number of awards the CEO has won in prior years, inclusive of awards won in other







At least 1 award 0.0372 0.0284 0.0215 0.0752
(2.84)*** (1.07) (0.74) (2.93)***
At least 2 awards -0.0187 -0.0537 0.0293 -0.1022
(0.69) (1.03) (0.50) (1.95)*
At least 3 awards -0.0151 -0.0431 0.0098 0.0554
(0.46) (0.72) (0.19) (0.77)
At least 4 awards 0.1001 0.0683 0.1139 0.1196
(2.18)** (0.94) (1.45) (1.46)
Book-to-Market Ratio -0.0273 -0.0173 -0.0241 -0.0193
(5.27)*** (1.97)* (1.34) (2.20)**
CEO Age 0.0007 -0.0229 -0.033 0.0029
(0.11) (1.87)* (1.43) (0.32)
CEO Tenure 0.0021 0.0057 0.0131 -0.0031
(0.88) (0.81) (0.95) (0.60)
Market Capitalization Deciles XXXX
Month Fixed Effects XXXX
Year Fixed Effects XXXX
CEO Fixed Effects XXXX
Observations 55,266 11,335 10,607 20,787
Number of CEOs 3,638 1,063 1,045 1,559
R
2 0.17 0.22 0.22 0.18
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 7. Earnings Management
The dependent variable is binary, where 1 signifies that the firm's quarterly earnings announcement exactly equals the median analyst
forecast among all analysts that make a forecast in the 30 calendar days prior to the announcement. Book-to-Market Ratio is book equity
over market capitalization and is measured at the end of last fiscal year to end at least six months prior to the earnings announcement. CEO
Age and Tenure are measured in years. Market Capitalization Deciles are constructed from the natural log of market capitalization at the
time of the earnings announcement. The Award Dummies measure the number of awards the CEO has won in prior years, inclusive of
awards won in other companies. GIM is the governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). All standard errors are clustered by
earnings announcement date.